Irish Author and Journalist - Danny Morrison

If Only

If only the arms had arrived. If only the rest of the country had risen with Dublin. If only Collins hadn't signed the Treaty in London. If only.

Everything is open to interpretation and the writing of history aims to illuminate the past and add to a notional, objective truth. Look how difficult if not impossible it is for the political parties to agree the immediate causes of the current stalemate? All the key players, caught up in a mix of prejudices, emotions, principles and pressures, are convinced that they are right and that the other side is disingenuous. But in years to come, upon reflection, a more honest view might emerge, if even privately, where some players admit to seeing things a bit differently. (Though not if you're Ted Heath.)

The writing of History is meant to take advantage of that distance, to view human actions and words and their repercussions, in the round, and make more accurate judgements about human behaviour. With the passage of time, as more and more official documents and private papers, including diaries and letters, are revealed, we have the advantage over the various protagonists of having more information than they had about each other.

I have just finished reading 'The Irish Revolution and its Aftermath, 1916-1923' by Frank Costello (Irish Academic Press, £35). I had previously read Costello's excellent book on Terence MacSwiney. For this, his most scholarly work to date, Costello has had access to previously unpublished sources, including military papers of Michael Collins and British cabinet papers. Thus this book is the most 'modern' account of that period - which republicans dogmatically refer to as 'the Tan War' (rather than the War of Independence) - but also examines the social, economic and political developments that followed.

Most successful politicians and military leaders have one thing in common: they understand that determination is co-dependent on ruthlessness. Michael Collins - who shot his way to the negotiating table - understood this dynamic, though it was British prime minister, Lloyd George, who had the superior power which he never balked at using and, indeed, his threat of unleashing 'immediate and terrible war' if Collins and fellow negotiators did not accept his compromise proposals was decisive. The terms of the Treaty - explicitly, dominion status with an oath to the crown (partition came in at a poor second as being objectionable) - also had the advantage of being so divisive that the Irish side split and fought a civil war which determined the political complexion of the twenty-six counties for decades.

Once again Michael Collins rises in stature from the pages of a history book as more fascinating and admirable than de Valera who strikes one as being more egotistical than principled. Collins, in direct contravention of the Treaty, took steps to keep the IRA in the North armed in order to protect vulnerable nationalist areas, which explains why many northern republicans remained loyal to him, even though it would become bitterly clear that the inclusion of the Boundary Commission as part of the Anglo-Irish Treaty was a deceptive device, a hollow promise, which should have been clear from the unionists crowing, 'Not an inch!' and 'What we have, we hold!'

The unionists in 1913 had everything going for them - their kinship to Britain, supporters within the British cabinet, arms from Germany and excellent leaders.

"There will be the danger and difficulties of trying to run a government of our own… I am told that it will be illegal… Don't be afraid of illegalities," Edward Carson told a meeting in Newry.

Costello says that Irish nationalists have failed to understand the determination on the part of Ulster Unionists to remain outside an Irish state, wrongly believing that they can be easily integrated if compelled by Britain. However, as a people who have been the victims of that 'determination' for decades, I think nationalists actually have a handle on what makes unionists tick. There is also no doubt of the nationalist/republican argument that were Britain to put a limited time on the union then the unionists would have to think more imaginatively about their relationship with the rest of the Irish people.

Historically, Costello sympathises with Collins. He is critical of the longevity of the recent armed struggle before a ceasefire was finally called in 1994, and though much of his analysis could be said to be mediated through a constitutional nationalist eye, he isn't easily bracketed. He certainly distances himself from the revisionists who claim that the armed struggle of 1919-21 was for nothing. He says: "the weight of historical evidence leads to the conclusion that the War of Independence indeed led to a greater degree of Irish freedom than that offered by the Government of Ireland Act (1920), and certainly beyond that offered by the false promise of Home Rule."

The details of the behind-the-scenes debates within the British cabinet, showing its arrogance and contempt, is fascinating. Similarly, the examination of the chemistry between Collins and de Valera, and how each handled the cards he was dealt.

Costello's book, though of the highest academic standard (and thus an excellent reference book: it includes the official texts of all agreements between Ireland and Britain since 1921), is written in an easy manner which makes it accessible to the average reader. It brings those dark and deadly times vividly alive, so that we can appreciate the dilemmas the leaders of the Irish Revolution faced, and empathise with them in their agonising decisions. And, with book in lap, repeat over and over again, 'If only, if only.'

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